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A FATHER’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GEORGIA
JUVENILE COURT LEGITIMATION
PROCEEDINGS: CLOSING THE DUE PROCESS
LOOPHOLE
Meg Buice*
INTRODUCTION
A parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child has been
universally regarded as fundamental and deserving of protection.1
Recognizing the significance of this “fiercely guarded” right,2 when
the State seeks to terminate parental rights in juvenile court, Georgia
law accords parents an array of procedural safeguards designed to
protect that interest3—among them, the right to an attorney in a
termination proceeding.4 By the time a deprivation case reaches the
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Carla Martin and
Jesse Buice for their encouragement and support. Special thanks to Becca Shepard and Naeem
Ramatally for their hard work, dedication, and insight throughout this process.
1. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children.”); see also Elizabeth Mills Viney, Comment, The Right to Counsel in
Parental-Rights Termination Cases: How a Clear and Consistent Legal Standard Would Better Protect
Indigent Families, 63 SMU L. REV. 1403, 1403 (2010).
2. In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]hen the State is terminating a parent’s
‘fundamental and fiercely guarded right’ to his or her child, although technically done in a civil
proceeding, the total and erroneous denial of appointed counsel during the termination hearing is
presumptively harmful because it calls into question the very structural integrity of the fact-finding
process.” (quoting Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307 (Ga. 1976))).
3. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 (Supp. 2011), § 15-11-96 (2012) (requiring personal service of summons
and petition to parties to a juvenile court termination of parental rights proceeding at least thirty days
prior to the hearing date); id. § 15-11-39.1 (allowing parties to a juvenile court proceeding—including a
proceeding to terminate parental rights—to be served by publication only if the court finds the
complaining party was unable to ascertain the responding party’s address or whereabouts after
reasonable efforts); id. § 15-11-99 (requiring a juvenile court’s finding that termination of parental
rights is in a child’s best interests to be supported by clear and convincing evidence); In re C.S., 644
S.E.2d 812, 812–13 (Ga. 2007) (finding insufficient service of process where a parent residing out of
state, who had not waived service, was not personally served but instead received summons via certified
mail); Taylor v. Padgett, 684 S.E.2d 434, 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding service by publication was
improper where the party alleging deprivation failed to utilize available channels of communication to
serve a parent who was living in a truck); In re C.I.W., 494 S.E.2d 291, 293–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding personal service of summons that did not include a copy of the petition to terminate parental
rights was constitutionally inadequate and violated Georgia law).
4. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012). In any proceeding terminating parental rights, “[i]f the parent or
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termination phase, the juvenile court has already found that the
parent in question has subjected his or her child to abuse or neglect
so severe that the child could not have remained in the parent’s home
without seriously jeopardizing the child’s welfare.5 Nonetheless, the
parent retains his or her right to an attorney because severing an
individual’s relationship with his or her child is considered “a tearing
of the flesh” only to be done by the courts “under the most carefully
controlled and regulated circumstances.”6
However, under current Georgia law, this right does not extend to
biological fathers of children born out of wedlock who have not
rendered their relationships with their children “legitimate” through
applicable statutory procedures.7 Unlike biological mothers and
fathers of children born in wedlock, biological fathers who have not
parents of the child desire to be represented by counsel but are indigent, the court shall appoint an
attorney for such parent or parents, which shall be a charge upon the funds of the county upon
certification thereof by the court . . . .” Id.; see also In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d at 12.
5. After an initial authorization for emergency removal, a juvenile court must hold a hearing
finding a child to be deprived in order to remove the child from his or her parents’ custody. See
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55 (a) (2012); DANETTE JOSLYN-GAUL, GEORGIA’S RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A REFERENCE MANUAL 36 (Karen Worthington ed., 2004), available at
http://bartoncenter.net/uploads/fall2011updates/dependency/Ga-responsibility.pdf.
Georgia law defines a “deprived child” as a child who is “without proper parental care or control,
subsistence, [or] education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child’s physical,
mental, or emotional health or morals.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (2012). “A [juvenile] court’s order
removing a child from [the parents’] home [must] be based upon a finding . . . that continuation in the
home would be contrary to the welfare of the child.” Id. § 15-11-58(a). Absent a few statutorily
enumerated exceptions, after a child is removed, the Department of Human Resources, Division of
Family and Children Services (DFCS) is required to provide the parent(s) with reunification services to
address the causes of deprivation. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (2012). In these cases, DFCS may only
pursue termination of a parent’s rights if he or she fails to correct the causes of deprivation through
reunification services. However, even if reunification services are not required, DFCS would not file a
motion requesting termination of a parent’s rights until after a court had adjudicated the child deprived
and removed the child from the parents’ custody. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Timothy
Pape, Ga. Juvenile Court Judge (July 8, 2011).
6. In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d at 11; In re P.D.W., 674 S.E.2d 338, 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). In In re
P.D.W., the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged overwhelming evidence that a mother’s chronic,
un-rehabilitated drug use, unemployment, and unstable housing rendered her incapable of providing
proper care for her children. Id. Despite this finding, the court vacated an order terminating the mother’s
parental rights because her limited intellectual capacity called into question whether her waiver of
counsel was both intelligent and voluntary. Id.
7. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 (2012). A father of a child born out of wedlock may render the child
legitimate through petitioning and obtaining an order of legitimation from the superior court in the
county where the child’s mother or legal guardian resides, the superior court in the county where an
adoption of the child is pending, or the juvenile court where deprivation proceedings concerning the
child are pending. Id.
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legitimated their children have no right to court-appointed counsel in
juvenile court termination proceedings.8 Moreover, these fathers are
denied all rights to challenge these proceedings on any basis.9
To obtain standing to contest a termination petition, a father must
legitimate his child.10 When a child is in DFCS custody, a father
typically begins this process by filing a petition for legitimation in
the juvenile court where the deprivation action is pending.11 In the
legitimation proceeding that follows, the father has the burden of
proof to establish both biological paternity and that he has
demonstrated the necessary level of commitment to the child.12
Because a denial of the legitimation petition eliminates the father’s
right to contest a later termination of his parental rights,13 the
significance of this decision is extraordinary. Yet, while a legal
parent’s right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings
is undisputed,14 in Georgia, a biological father has no established
8. See, e.g., In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (dismissing a biological father’s
argument that he was denied the right to counsel in termination proceedings as moot because—due to
the juvenile court’s denial of his petition to legitimate his child—he had no standing to contest a
termination of his parental rights).
9. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). A biological father who is not the legal father of a child may not
object to the termination of his parental rights if he does not file a petition to legitimate the child within
specified time frame or if, after filing such a petition, the action is dismissed for failure to prosecute or is
otherwise denied or concluded without a court order finding that he is the child’s legal father. Id.
10. Georgia Juvenile Code section 15-11-96(i) provides:
A biological father who is not the legal father loses all rights to the child and the court
shall enter an order terminating all such father’s rights to the child and such father may
not thereafter object to the termination of his rights to the child if within 30 days from his
receipt of the notice provided for in subsection (e) of this Code section he: (1) Does not
file a legitimation petition and give notice as required in subsection (h) of this Code
section; (2) Files a legitimation petition which is subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute; or (3) Files a legitimation petition and the action is subsequently concluded
without a court order declaring a finding that he is the legal father of the child.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012).
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
12. When deciding whether to grant a biological father’s petition for legitimation, a court “must
initially determine whether the father has abandoned his opportunity interest to develop a relationship
with the child.” In re L.S.T., 649 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Smith v. Soligon, 561
S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)). “If the juvenile court concludes that the father has abandoned his
opportunity interest, that finding is sufficient to end the court’s inquiry and justifies the denial of the
legitimation petition.” Id.
13. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012).
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; cf. COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES OF GEORGIA,
BENCHBOOK ch. IX (2013), available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/councils/cjcj/PDF/Benchbook%
20Chapters/ch09.PDF (“Because of the significant issues in termination of parental rights cases, some
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right to counsel in legitimation proceedings despite the gravity of the
interest at stake.15 In essence, denying putative fathers the right to
counsel in legitimation proceedings provides a mechanism by which
juvenile courts may deprive them of their fundamental liberty interest
in parenting their children without due process.
In re J.S. illustrates the issue.16 In J.S., a child’s biological father
filed a petition to legitimate his son in the Juvenile Court of Spalding
County, where a termination action was pending.17 The legitimation
proceeding was scheduled to take place in conjunction with the
termination hearing, and after informing the court that he was
indigent, the father requested the court appoint counsel to represent
him in both matters.18 Acknowledging concern over conducting the
termination hearing without appointing counsel for the father, the
court elected to postpone the termination and proceeded only on the
legitimation hearing, denying the father’s request for counsel in that
hearing.19 Despite the mother’s consent to the legitimation, the court
denied the petition and entered an order terminating the father’s
parental rights without a hearing, finding that the denial of the
legitimation petition deprived him of standing to contest the
termination.20 Thus, in denying the legitimation petition, the court
was able to avoid even holding a termination proceeding as to the
judges appoint attorneys to represent the interests of parents who cannot be personally served, even
absent a request.”).
15. See Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806–07 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding an indigent
father had no right to court-appointed counsel in a legitimation proceeding brought in superior court); In
re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 805) (finding a father
was not entitled to an attorney to represent him at public expense in a juvenile court legitimation
proceeding). But cf. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985) (holding that a
putative father was a party to deprivation proceedings within the meaning of the Georgia statute and, as
such, was entitled to representation at all stages of the proceedings, including a hearing to establish
paternity); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Taylor Auto Grp. v. Jessie, 527
S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)) (declining to examine the merit of a biological father’s contention that
an order terminating his parental rights should be vacated because the juvenile court failed to appoint
him counsel in a legitimation proceeding, given his failure to raise the issue at trial).
16. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d at 250.
17. Id. at 251.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 251–52 (“Despite his request, the father ‘was not entitled to have an attorney appointed to
represent him at public expense in the legitimation proceedings.’” (quoting Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at
806)).
20. Id.
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father, where he would have been entitled to court-appointed
counsel.21
This Note examines whether denying a putative father22 the right
to counsel in the context of juvenile court legitimation proceedings
amounts to a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process because of the state’s direct role in depriving him of a
fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his children.
Part I examines the procedure by which a father of a child born out of
wedlock may legitimate his child under Georgia law and describes
parents’ right to counsel in juvenile court termination proceedings.23
Part II explores the current state of the law regarding a putative
father’s right to counsel in these proceedings.24 Part II also considers
the constitutionality of denying a biological father the right to
counsel in contested legitimation proceedings in light of Georgia and
United States Supreme Court precedent on the issues of standards of
proof in legitimation actions and due process requirements accorded
to parents in termination proceedings.25 Part III proposes that the
Georgia General Assembly amend the Georgia Juvenile Code to
require appointment of counsel to putative fathers in contested
legitimation proceedings.26
I. LEGITIMATION AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN
GEORGIA
A. Legitimation Procedure In Juvenile Court Deprivation Cases
Under Georgia law, a child born out of wedlock is not the legal
child of his or her biological father.27 Unless the biological father
21. See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text.
22. A putative father is an unmarried father who has not legitimated the child or been declared the
child’s father in a paternity action. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 611 (9th ed. 2009).
23. See discussion infra Part I.
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(10.1) (2012). In the context of juvenile court deprivation proceedings, a
“legal father” is defined as “a male who has . . . legally adopted a child; . . . [w]as married to the
biological mother of that child at the time the child was conceived or was born . . .;” married the child’s
biological mother after the child’s birth and “recognized the child as his own;” or “has legitimated the
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subsequently marries the child’s mother, he must either
administratively legitimate the child or petition a court of competent
jurisdiction to become the child’s legal father.28 Although the
administrative legitimation procedure provides putative fathers the
opportunity to establish legal fatherhood by signing a voluntary
acknowledgement of legitimation with the written consent of the
child’s mother, the acknowledgement has no legal consequence
unless it is executed during the first year of a child’s life.29
Additionally, contrary to the belief of many Georgians (and unlike in
many other states),30 being listed as the father on the child’s birth

child” pursuant to procedures set forth in Georgia Code section 19-7-22 or 19-7-21.1. Id. See generally
DAN E. MCCONAUGHEY, GEORGIA DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND CHILD CUSTODY § 25:6 (2011–2012 ed.).
The mother of a child born out of wedlock is the only legally recognized parent unless and until the
child’s biological father brings a legitimation action to render the child legitimate. Id.
28. Georgia provides two methods by which a putative father may legitimate his child: (1) by
petitioning the superior court in the county where the child’s legal parent or guardian resides or where
an adoption action is pending; or by petitioning the juvenile court in the county where a deprivation
action concerning the child is pending; and (2) through signing a voluntary acknowledgement of
legitimation with the consent of the mother during the child’s first year of life. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-22, 197-21.1 (2010); see also In re T.W., 654 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing a juvenile
court’s order requiring father to submit to genetic testing to establish his paternity because, in having
signed a voluntary acknowledgement of legitimation pursuant to Georgia Code sections 19-7-21.1 and
19-7-46.1, he had already established his legal status with respect to the children).
29. Georgia Code section 19-7-21.1 provides:
Prior to the child’s first birthday, a father of a child born out of wedlock may render his
relationship with the child legitimate when both the mother and father have freely agreed,
consented, and signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and an acknowledgment
of legitimation which have been made and have not been rescinded pursuant to Code
Section 19-7-46.1. . . . [A] [v]oluntary acknowledgment of legitimation shall not be
recognized if: . . . [t]he child is one year of age or older.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21.1(b)–(c) (2010).
30. Several states require putative fathers of children born out of wedlock to execute
acknowledgments of paternity as a prerequisite to being listed as the child’s father on the birth
certificate. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Fiscal Sess.) (“If
the mother was not married at the time of either conception or birth[,] . . . the name of the father shall
not be entered on the certificate of birth without an affidavit of paternity signed by the mother and the
person to be named as the father. . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-63-165 (West, Westlaw through 2012
Reg. Sess.). Because the acknowledgments establish legal fatherhood in those states, being listed as the
father on the child’s birth certificate is proof of legal fatherhood. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10120(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Fiscal Sess.) (“A man is the father of a child for all intents and
purposes if he and the mother execute an acknowledgment of paternity of the child . . . .”); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-17-50 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). While this is not the case in Georgia, many
fathers believe that being listed on their child’s birth certificate establishes legal fatherhood. See, e.g., In
re E.D.T., 505 S.E.2d 516, 518 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (addressing a biological father’s claim that he
believed he was the child’s legal father because he signed the child’s birth certificate).
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certificate or obtaining a court order establishing paternity does not
establish legal fatherhood.31
The question of a putative father’s legal standing typically arises
either in the context of custody disputes between the biological father
and the mother or other relative of the child, or in juvenile court
deprivation proceedings.32 In deprivation proceedings,33 juvenile
courts generally require that putative fathers of children born out of
wedlock establish paternity and legitimate the child as part of a courtordered case plan for reunification.34 This requirement is important

31. A mother who is seeking child support for a child whose paternity is contested must obtain a
court order establishing the putative father’s biological paternity and duty to support the child. See
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-49(a) (2010). While this paternity order constitutes proof of biological fatherhood, it
does not provide a father with any legal rights as to the child, and its “sole effect” is to establish a
father’s duty to support the child. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Nunez, 555 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (finding, in the context of a probate matter, that a child’s mother could not seek a determination of
paternity in order to establish her son’s right to inherit from his deceased father because the sole purpose
of a paternity action under Georgia Code section 19-7-49 is to establish a father’s duty to support a
child).
32. See MCCONAUGHEY, supra note 27, § 11:65 (noting custody challenges, juvenile court
deprivation proceedings, and contested adoptions among the contexts in which petitions for legitimation
are brought).
33. To initiate a deprivation action, the complainant must file a petition alleging that the children
named in the petition are deprived, after which the court will schedule and hold an adjudication hearing.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35 (2012). This hearing must take place within ten days if the child has already been
placed in DFCS custody pursuant to an emergency removal and subsequent probable cause
determination. Id. § 15-11-55(a)(2)(D). If the court adjudicates the child deprived, it may order that the
child remain in DFCS custody (or be placed in DFCS custody if the child was not previously removed),
be placed in the custody of a third party, or issue a protective order allowing the child to remain in the
home under specific guidelines. Id. § 15-11-55(a). If the child remains in DFCS custody or under courtordered supervision, the juvenile court will continue to oversee the case to ensure that the causes of
deprivation are remedied or, in the alternative, that another permanent living arrangement for the child is
secured. See generally id. § 15-11-58.
34. See, e.g., In re M.D.N., 657 S.E.2d 594, 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296,
297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re A.J., 654 S.E.2d 465, 466–67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re E.D.T., 505
S.E.2d at 517. In In re of S.M.G., in an order terminating a biological father’s parental rights, the
juvenile court found that ever since the children had been initially adjudicated deprived, the court had
“repeatedly” informed the biological father of his responsibility to legitimate, yet he had failed to do so.
In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 297. In In re E.D.T., the court found that a biological father’s responsibility
to legitimate his child was included as a goal in his DFCS case plan for reunification and that the father
acknowledged that his DFCS caseworker had instructed him to file a legitimation petition on several
occasions. In re E.D.T., 505 S.E.2d at 517. Similarly, in In re A.J., a biological father’s case plan
required him to legitimate his child, among other goals. In re A.J., 654 S.E.2d at 466–67. In In re
M.D.N., the father’s case plan, filed with the juvenile court and bearing his signature, required that he
legitimate his child. Both the seventy-two-hour hearing order and order of adjudication included
findings that the father would have “no rights” until he legitimated his child. In re M.D.N., 657 S.E.2d at
596.
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for two reasons. First, in the context of reunification proceedings35—
without serious legal acrobatics—a juvenile court cannot give legal
custody of a child to a biological father who has not legitimated.36
Second, as previously stated, a putative father who has not
legitimated his child has no standing to object to a termination of his
parental rights.37
B. Evaluating Legitimation Claims Based On Fathers’ Asserted
Relationship Interest
While a child’s biological mother is automatically his or her legal
mother unless her rights are terminated or surrendered, a biological
father must prove more than genetic paternity to establish legal
fatherhood.38 As a threshold question, a court must determine
whether the biological father has abandoned his opportunity interest

35. When a deprived child is removed from his or her home and placed in DFCS custody, the
Department is required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his or her parents unless the
court finds that reunification efforts would be detrimental to the child. See generally O.C.G.A. § 15-1158 (2012). These efforts center around a case plan for reunification—developed by the Department and
approved by the court—that addresses the causes of deprivation through specific behavioral goals and
required participation in appropriate community-based services. Id. § 15-11-58(c). The juvenile court
conducts periodic review hearings to oversee compliance with the court-ordered plan and determine
whether reunification remains in the child’s best interest. Id. § 15-11-58. When a parent has successfully
addressed all the issues that led to the child’s removal, the juvenile court may terminate the
Department’s legal custody of the child and return the child to the legal custody of his or her parent(s).
See id. § 15-11-58.1(b); JOSLYN-GAUL, supra note 5, at 43–47.
36. In re A.D., 648 S.E.2d 786, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a biological father had no standing
to request custody in juvenile court absent proof that he had legitimated his child); JOHN C. MAYOUE, 8
GEORGIA JURISPRUDENCE: FAMILY LAW § 9:10 (2006) (“The father of a child born out-of-wedlock has
no right to custody of that child . . . unless the father legitimizes the child as provided for by statute.”
(footnote omitted)).
37. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012); see also In re C.G., 658 S.E.2d 448, 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); In
re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 297. A father whose legitimation action was concluded without a determination
that he was the legal father of the child had no standing to object to termination of his parental rights. In
re C.G., 658 S.E.2d at 456. A putative father’s failure to file a legitimation petition warranted
termination of his parental rights. In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 297.
38. See In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987). In evaluating a father’s petition to
legitimate his child, a court must initially determine whether he has abandoned his opportunity interest
in developing a relationship with the child. Id. at 462. If the court finds that he has abandoned his
opportunity interest, the court may deny his petition without a finding of parental unfitness, so long as
the denial is in the child’s best interests. Id. If a father has not abandoned his opportunity interest in
developing a relationship with his child, a court is only justified in denying his petition to legitimate if it
finds he is an unfit parent. Id.; see also Bowers v. Pearson, 609 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(reiterating the standard established in Eason).
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in developing a relationship with the child.39 If it determines that he
has, the court may end the inquiry and deny the petition.40 If the court
finds the father has not abandoned his opportunity interest, in actions
where the state has interfered with the parent–child relationship, the
court applies the parental fitness standard to determine whether the
father should be permitted to legitimate the child.41
The parental fitness standard considers whether the putative father
is fit to have custody of his child, regardless of whether available
alternatives—such as allowing the child to be adopted by another
party—would better serve the child’s interest.42 If the court
determines the father is fit, it is required to grant the legitimation.43 If
the state is not involved, the court considers the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether to apply a parental fitness or best
interests of the child standard.44 Under the best interests standard, the
court has discretionary authority to decide whether granting the
petition would be in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether
the putative father is fit to have custody.45 Although many have
39. The Georgia Supreme Court explained:
[U]nwed fathers gain from their biological connection with a child an opportunity interest
to develop a relationship with their children which is constitutionally protected. This
opportunity interest begins at conception and endures probably throughout the minority
of the child. But it is not indestructible. It may be lost . . . if not timely pursued. On the
other hand it is an interest which an unwed father has a right to pursue through his
commitment to becoming a father in a true relational sense as well as in a biological
sense. Absent abandonment of his interest, a state may not deny a biological father a
reasonable opportunity to establish a relationship with his child.
Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 462.
40. In re L.S.T., 649 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); MARK H. MURPHY, GEORGIA JUVENILE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS § 8:16 (5th ed. 2012).
41. Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 459.
42. Id. at 463.
43. Id.
44. Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. 2001) (“[A]bsent the State’s involvement and under
other circumstances, the best interests of the child standard would be adequate.”). For instance, the court
may apply a best interests standard in a situation where the state is not involved and a putative father
seeks to establish his paternity of a child who already has a legal father (because the child was born to a
woman who was married to a man who was not the child’s biological father) with an established
relationship to that child. Id. Additionally, a best interests test is adequate where an unwed father seeks
to challenge the adoption of his child by the child’s stepfather. Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 463.
45. Like many other states, Georgia does not provide a statutory definition for the “best interests of
the child” standard. In determining whether granting a legitimation petition is in the child’s best
interests, the court has broad discretion to consider whatever factors it deems appropriate and relevant.
See Susan Nauss Exon, The Best Interest of the Child: Going Beyond Legalese to Empathize with a
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questioned the fundamental fairness of imposing heightened proof
requirements on fathers,46 the practice has stood up to constitutional
challenges in both the United States and Georgia Supreme Courts.47
C. Right To Counsel In Termination Of Parental Rights Proceedings
While the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
termination of parental rights proceedings implicate a fundamental
liberty interest that requires protection by clear procedural
safeguards,48 it has not found that due process requires the
appointment of counsel to indigent parents in every termination
case.49 Nonetheless, given the fundamental nature of parents’ right to
the care and custody of their children, the Supreme Court has
expressed doubts as to whether terminating a parent’s rights without
a showing of parental unfitness would be constitutional.50
Client’s Leap of Faith, 24 J. JUV. L. 1, 3 (2004).
46. Laura Oren, Unmarried Fathers and Adoption: “Perfecting” or “Abandoning” an Opportunity
Interest, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 253 (2007) (examining Supreme Court precedent regarding the so-called
“biology plus” standard as articulated in a series of cases where the constitutionality of the standard was
challenged on various grounds); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
47. See, e.g., Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459. The constitutionality of Georgia’s legitimation statute has been
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
48. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court explained:
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing
the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections
than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982).
49. The Court has not considered an indigent parent’s right to counsel in termination of parental
rights (TPR) proceedings since Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, more than
three decades ago. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In Lassiter, while the Court recognized that a parent’s right to
the “‘companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that
‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection,’” it found that
denying a parent’s right to counsel in termination proceedings would not constitute a due process
violation in every circumstance. Id. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
Instead, the Court explained that whether a denial of counsel in termination proceedings violates due
process must be examined in light of the specific facts and circumstances in each case. Id. at 30. The
Lassiter Court held that in the case before it, where the child’s mother had not even demonstrated an
interest in appearing at the custody hearing, the lower court did not err in failing to appoint counsel. Id.
at 33.
50. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 n.10 (“Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate
a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness.”); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (“We have little doubt
that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a
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Recognizing the gravity of an order of termination, almost every
state accords indigent parents a statutory right to court-appointed
counsel in these proceedings.51 Georgia is no exception.52 Moreover,
Georgia courts have consistently held that failure to provide counsel
for an indigent parent in a termination proceeding mandates reversal
of an order of termination, regardless of the weight of the State’s
evidence of abuse or neglect.53 In so doing, these courts have
recognized the principle articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Santosky v. Kramer that “[t]he fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents
or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”54
It follows then that this fundamental interest deserves no less
recognition when asserted by fathers of children born out of wedlock,
simply because their failure to legitimate their children prior to the
commencement of deprivation proceedings renders them something
less than “model parents.” Nonetheless, because putative fathers are
required to legitimate their children to have standing to contest a

natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’” (quoting Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
51. See Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Cases: The
Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 184 (2004) (“Almost every state
provides counsel to indigent parents either through public defender offices, a system of appointed
counsel, or contracts with groups of attorneys.”); see also 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD
CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 13:6 (3d ed. 2009). While most states provide a statutory
right to counsel for indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings, some states accord
this right through common law. Id. Only five states—Delaware, Hawaii, Tennessee, Wyoming, and
South Carolina—do not provide indigent parents with a mandatory statutory right to counsel in TPR
proceedings. Iokona Baker & Faye Kimura, Access to Justice: Parents’ Right to Counsel in Termination
of Parental Rights Cases, HAW. BUS. J., Dec. 2008, at 11, 12.
52. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012).
53. See, e.g., In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12–13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); In re P.D.W., 674 S.E.2d 338,
340 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). In In re P.D.W., the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that DFCS had
presented sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s determination that termination was in the
children’s best interests. Id. Nonetheless, because the juvenile court failed to appoint counsel to the
purportedly indigent mother because she had not requested it prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeals
vacated the termination order. Id. at 348.
54. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also, e.g., In re A.M.A.,
607 S.E.2d 916, 922–23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (comparing an indigent parent’s right to counsel in TPR
proceedings to that of a criminal defendant and characterizing the right as constitutional in nature).
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termination55 and since a juvenile court’s denial of a father’s
legitimation petition establishes an absolute requirement that the
court grant a pending petition to terminate his parental rights,56
denying counsel to a putative father in a juvenile court legitimation
proceeding has the same effect as denying him counsel in a
termination proceeding.
II. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN CONTEXT
A. Procedural Due Process Requirements In Parental Rights Cases
Where The State Is An Actor
In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the custody of their children that is “far more precious than
any property right.”57 In determining that the need to terminate
parental rights must be established by “clear and convincing
evidence,” the Court observed that parents’ right to custody is not
diminished because the children were deprived in their care.58 To the
contrary, where parents face a termination of their parental rights,
they have an even greater need for procedural protections.59

55. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(h) (2012).
56. Id. § 15-11-96(i). If a father fails to successfully legitimate his child within the required time
frame, “the court shall enter an order terminating all such father’s rights to the child . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added); see also In re D.W., 592 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“In the absence of standing to
object to the termination of parental rights for an untimely filed legitimation petition, entry of an order
terminating parental rights [is] mandatory.”); MURPHY, supra note 40, § 6:8. Murphy clarifies:
When a putative father fails to timely file and pursue his legitimation petition in
keeping with the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 15-11-96, the juvenile court is
required to terminate his parental rights. The trial court has no discretion to grant a
putative father more time to file for legitimation than the 30 days allowed by statute.
Moreover, after the expiration of 30 days, the father loses standing to make any
arguments in connection with the termination of his parental rights.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
57. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59.
58. Id. at 753 (explaining that even if the State has taken custody of their children, parents retain a
“vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life”).
59. Id. (“If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more
critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family
affairs.”).
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In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County,
the Supreme Court declined to hold that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states appoint counsel to
indigent parents in every termination case, yet the Court explicitly
acknowledged that in many circumstances, a parent’s asserted liberty
interest in the parent–child relationship is significant enough to
require appointment of counsel.60 Acknowledging that termination of
parental rights must be “accomplished by procedures meeting the
requisites of the Due Process Clause,”61 the Court held that because
the mother in Lassiter failed to demonstrate any interest in contesting
the termination, due process was not offended by the juvenile court’s
failure to appoint counsel.62 Nonetheless, the Court specifically
praised the wisdom of statutes requiring appointment of counsel in all
termination proceedings, although such requirements impose higher
standards than “those minimally tolerable under the Constitution.”63
Recognizing the importance of the liberty interest at stake in
termination proceedings, Georgia has enacted such a statute.64
Georgia courts have consistently protected parents’ due process
rights in this context, requiring strict construction of the statute

60. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (“If, in a given case,
the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest . . . it could not be
said that . . . due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.”).
61. Id. at 37.
62. Id. at 33. The Court noted that the unrepresented mother had not even bothered to appear at a
prior custody hearing and had failed, without cause, to attempt to contest the termination of her parental
rights. Id.
63. Id. at 33. The Court explained:
A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards be adopted than those
minimally tolerable under the Constitution. Informed opinion has clearly come to hold
that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in
parental termination proceedings, but also in dependency and neglect proceedings as
well. Most significantly, 33 States and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the
appointment of counsel in termination cases. The Court’s opinion today in no way
implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely
followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise.
Id. at 33–34 (citations omitted).
64. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98 (2012). Before this code section was enacted, courts construed Georgia
Code section 15-11-6(b) (formerly section 15-11-30(b))—which extends the right to counsel to parties
in deprivation proceedings—to provide for parents’ right to counsel in termination of parental rights
proceedings. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6 (2012), construed in Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d
20, 24 (Ga. 1985).
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conferring the right to counsel.65 Furthermore, Georgia courts have
gone so far as to apply additional procedural safeguards to
termination proceedings, even when not explicitly provided by
statute.66 For example, in Nix v. Georgia Department of Human
Resources, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a mother who
appealed a termination of her parental rights was entitled to receive a
transcript of the proceeding at the state’s expense.67 Although the
Georgia Code did not explicitly so require, the court found that
denying the mother a pauperized transcript would directly contradict
the legislature’s intent to protect a parent’s “fundamental and fiercely
guarded” rights to his or her child by securing effective
representation at “all stages of any proceeding involving the
termination of that parent’s right to his or her child.”68
B. Due Process Requirements In Putative Fathers’ Parentage Claims
Both the United States and Georgia Supreme Courts have
recognized that a biological father’s parental rights accord
diminished protection if he makes no attempt to develop a
relationship with his child.69 Nonetheless, absent a showing that a
65. See, e.g., In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (overruling precedent requiring that
a parent erroneously denied counsel in a termination proceeding establish harm in order to prevail on an
appeal because such a requirement “does not comport with the [Georgia] Supreme Court’s directive that
we guarantee ‘the most stringent procedural safeguards’ in termination cases” (quoting Sanchez v.
Walker Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 229 S.E.2d 66, 70 (Ga. 1976))).
66. E.g., Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ga. 1976). Similarly, in Thorne v.
Padgett, the Georgia Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute preventing a parent
who had failed to provide financial support for his child from challenging adoption proceedings where
the state was not involved. Thorne v. Padgett, 386 S.E.2d 155, 155 (Ga. 1989) (construing O.C.G.A.
§ 19-8-6(b) (1986)). In Thorne, the court found that preventing a challenge to adoption proceedings was,
in essence, a termination of parental rights. Id. at 156. As such, the Court declared the statute
unconstitutional because it “circumvents the constitutional requirement that a natural parent’s rights in
his child may not be terminated absent a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of his unfitness.”
Id. at 156.
67. Nix, 225 S.E.2d at 307.
68. Id. at 307–08.
69. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga.
1987). While a putative father who has demonstrated his commitment to his child through assuming
some parental responsibilities may rightly claim an interest in the parent–child relationship warranting
protection under the due process clause, “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. A putative father’s right to develop a
relationship with his child exists through biology but may be abandoned if not asserted timely. Eason,
358 S.E.2d at 462; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979). Although a statute denying
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father has abandoned his interest in developing a relationship with his
child, both courts have affirmed that this interest requires due process
protections in proceedings where it may be challenged.70 In Stanley v.
Illinois, an Illinois statute authorized the Department of Human
Resources to remove children from their putative father’s custody
following their mother’s death without a hearing to determine his
unfitness.71 Rejecting the State’s argument that the father lacked a
constitutionally protected interest in his children given the absence of
a legal relationship,72 the Court held the statute violated the Due
Process Clause because it deprived the father of custody without an
opportunity to demonstrate his fitness as a parent.73
In Quilloin v. Walcott, the United States Supreme Court
considered a putative father’s challenge to Georgia courts’
application of a best interests standard to determine whether he
should be permitted to legitimate his child.74 In that case, a putative
father who had never had custody of his son filed a petition to
legitimate after receiving notice that the child’s stepfather had filed a
petition to adopt the child.75 The trial court applied a best interests
any father of a child born out of wedlock the right to withhold consent to the child’s adoption violates
the Equal Protection Clause, in cases where a father has abandoned his child, the Equal Protection
Clause would not preclude the state from withholding this privilege. Id.
70. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 108 (Ga. 2001) (requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof in a
custody dispute between the biological father of child born out of wedlock and the child’s
grandparents); Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 463.
71. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646 (“Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the
State upon the death of the mother. Accordingly, upon [their mother’s] death, in a dependency
proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and
placed with court-appointed guardians.” (footnote omitted)).
72. Id. at 652 (“‘To say that the test of equal protection should be the ‘legal’ rather than the
biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the
authority of a State to draw such ‘legal’ lines as it chooses.’” (quoting Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968))).
73. Id. at 658. The Court found the State’s argument that its interest in judicial efficiency warranted
a presumption of unfitness for all unwed fathers to be a wholly inadequate justification for denying the
putative father due process in light of his substantial interest in keeping his family intact. Id. Moreover,
the Court found that the statute also violated the Equal Protection Clause because it applied unilaterally
to unwed fathers. Id. at 652.
74. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
75. Id. Under Georgia law, an un-legitimated father has no power to contest an adoption of his child
but may acquire the authority to veto the adoption if he legitimates his child within the statutory time
frame. Id. Notably, the father in Quilloin had never lived with his child and was not seeking custody but
instead only sought an order of legitimation to prevent the child from being adopted by his stepfather.
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standard to deny the legitimation petition and grant the stepfather’s
adoption.76 The Court found that applying a best interests standard
under the facts presented did not violate due process.77 The Court
began by reaffirming Stanley’s holding that a parent’s relationship
with his or her child is constitutionally protected,78 but nonetheless
found that where the effect of a legitimation petition would be to give
legal recognition to a “family unit already in existence,” a best
interests standard was adequate.79 Nonetheless, the Court cautioned
that due process would be offended if the “State were to attempt to
force the breakup of a natural family” simply because it was thought
to be in the child’s best interests.80
Similarly, in In re Baby Girl Eason, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that where the state plays a role in limiting a father’s opportunity
to develop a relationship with his child, absent a showing that he has
abandoned his opportunity to do so, a best interests standard may not
constitutionally be applied to deny his petition for legitimation.81
Although in Eason the child’s mother had placed the child for
adoption through a private agency, the court found that because the
adoption was being pursued through state courts pursuant to state
adoption laws, state participation was significant enough to require
the court to examine the legitimation petition under a parental fitness,
rather than best interests, standard.82
Id. at 255. By contrast, the child’s stepfather had lived with the child for nine years before initiating the
adoption petition, and the child himself indicated a desire to be adopted by his stepfather. Id. at 247,
251. Although the mother acknowledged that the putative father had visited the child from time to time
and had brought him presents, she testified that the visits tended to have a disruptive effect on the child.
Id. at 251.
76. Id. at 247.
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id. at 255 (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected.” (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972))).
79. Id. at 255.
80. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63
(1977)). The Court also stressed that the putative father in this case had never had or sought legal
custody of his child and that this was not a case where the proposed adoption would place the child with
an adoptive family with whom he had never lived. Id.
81. In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987).
82. Id. Additionally, the court noted that even though the adoptive parents had developed a
relationship with the child and the father had not, given the child’s age (nine months) and the delay
created by the adoption proceedings, the court could not determine on the record whether the father had
abandoned his interest in developing a relationship with his daughter. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/4

16

Buice: A Father's Right to Counsel in Georgia Juvenile Court Legitimatio

2013] FATHER’S RIGHTS IN GEORGIA LEGITIMATION PROCEEDINGS

881

C. Right To Counsel In Legitimation Proceedings In Georgia
Juvenile Courts
While the Georgia and United States Supreme Courts have
delineated specific procedural safeguards applicable in different
types of parental rights cases,83 neither court has articulated a clear
standard regarding a putative father’s right to counsel in legitimation
proceedings. The Supreme Court has not considered the issue, and
the few Georgia cases that examine whether such a right exists reflect
contrasting positions.84 In Wilkins v. Department of Human
Resources, the Georgia Supreme Court considered a putative father’s
claim that he was entitled to representation in a juvenile court hearing
to establish his paternity and terminate his parental rights.85 The
putative father appeared at a hearing on DFCS’s petition to terminate
his parental rights on grounds that he had abandoned the child.86 As
permitted under then-existing law, Wilkins sought to establish his
paternity so that he could be afforded a right to be heard in the
termination proceeding.87 Although he appeared without counsel, the
juvenile court failed to inquire, as required by statute, whether
Wilkins was aware of his right to counsel.88 Finding that Wilkins
83. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392
(1979); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d
99 (Ga. 2001); Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 463.
84. See Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d
296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); discussion
infra Part II.C.
85. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 20.
86. Id. at 20–21.
87. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b), repealed in 1986, provided:
[i]f the paternity of a child born out of wedlock has been established in a judicial
proceeding to which the father was a party prior to the filing of the petition [to terminate
parental rights], the father shall be served with summons as provided by this chapter.
Such father has the right to be heard unless he has relinquished all paternal rights with
reference to the child. The putative father of the child whose paternity has not been so
established, upon proof of his paternity of the child, may appear in the proceedings and
be heard.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b) (1981) (emphasis added), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3, construed in
Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 21–22 (Ga. 1985).
88. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 21. The requirement that the court undertake such an inquiry was
established under Georgia Code section 15-11-30(b), which provided that “[i]f a party appears [in a
deprivation proceeding] without counsel, the court shall ascertain whether he knows of his right to
counsel and to be provided with counsel by the court if he is an indigent person.” Id. (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 15-11-30(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3).
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failed to demonstrate paternity, the court proceeded to terminate his
parental rights.89 Wilkins appealed, arguing that the trial court’s
failure to inform him of his right to appointed counsel in the paternity
proceeding required reversal of the termination.90
Affirming the judgment and holding Wilkins was not entitled to
representation, the Court of Appeals reasoned that an indigent
putative father who has not demonstrated interest in parenting his
child has a diminished right to representation in termination
proceedings.91 Expressly rejecting this line of reasoning, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that in determining whether a putative father is
entitled to representation in termination proceedings, the critical
inquiry is not whether he acted as a father to the child but rather
whether he is a party to the proceedings within the meaning of the
Georgia Juvenile Code.92
The court found that Wilkins clearly qualified as an indigent
“party” to the paternity proceeding as defined under Georgia law93
and that as such, he was entitled to court-appointed counsel “at all
stages of any proceedings alleging . . . [inter alia] deprivation.”94
Because the Code required that a putative father establish paternity as
a prerequisite to challenging a termination action, the court found the
hearing to establish paternity was “clearly . . . a stage of [the]
termination proceeding,” and that as a party the putative father was
entitled to representation in the hearing to establish his paternity.95
89. Id. at 20, 21.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Notably, the court also rejected the Department of Human Resources’ contention that Wilkins
was not entitled to present evidence to establish his paternity because he was not the putative father of a
child born “out of wedlock.” Id. at 21. Because the mother of Wilkins’ child was married to another man
when the child was born, the court acknowledged that Georgia Code section 19-7-20 created a
presumption of legitimacy in the mother’s husband. Id. at 23. However, the court found that in the
context of termination of parental rights proceedings, the putative father was entitled to present evidence
to rebut that presumption. Id.
93. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 24. The court explained the term “party” is broadly defined in Georgia
law as “one who is directly interested in the subject matter of the litigation,” and is entitled to present
evidence and “appeal from the judgment.” Id. The court found that in the context of a paternity hearing
brought in conjunction with a juvenile court TPR proceeding, a putative father “clearly falls within
[this] . . . definition.” Id.
94. Id. at 21 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3).
95. Id. at 24. Moreover, the court expressly noted that because Georgia Code section 15-11-52(b)
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Although the Georgia Juvenile Code has undergone several
revisions since Wilkins,96 the revisions have not resulted in such a
substantive change that Wilkins’ holding should cease to apply. Two
primary differences distinguish the Code sections examined in
Wilkins and the version currently in force.97 First, under the statute
examined in Wilkins, the parents’ right to counsel in termination
proceedings was implied under the general provision extending the
right to parties at all stages of deprivation proceedings.98 Although
the current Code still contains a virtually identical provision,99 an
added provision explicitly extends the right to parents in termination
of parental rights proceedings.100
The other difference is that while former Georgia Code section 1511-52(b) granted a putative father the right to “appear” and “be
heard” in termination proceedings after presenting proof of
paternity,101 the current Code imposes the more stringent requirement
that a putative father succeed in a legitimation action to obtain
standing to contest a termination.102 The current Juvenile Code also
imposed a burden on the putative father to establish his paternity as a prerequisite to challenging a
termination of his parental rights, the paternity hearing is a “decisive” stage of a termination proceeding
at which the putative father “has a critical need for legal representation.” Id.
96. GA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, COMMON WISDOM: MAKING THE CASE FOR A NEW
GEORGIA JUVENILE CODE 19 (2008) [hereinafter COMMON WISDOM], available at
http://www.gaappleseed.org/children/reports/summary.pdf.
97. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981), and id. § 15-11-52(b), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws
1017, § 3, with O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-96(i), 15-11-98 (2012).
98. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981).
99. Former Georgia Code section 15-11-30(b) has been renumbered and appears in virtually
identical form in current Georgia Code section 15-11-6(b), which reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided under this article, a party is entitled to representation by
legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings alleging delinquency, unruliness,
incorrigibility, or deprivation and if, as an indigent person, a party is unable to employ
counsel, he or she is entitled to have the court provide counsel for him or her. If a party
appears without counsel, the court shall ascertain whether such party knows of his or her
right to counsel and to be provided with counsel by the court if he or she is an indigent
person.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b) (2012). Aside from minor semantic revisions, the only change is the addition of
proceedings alleging “incorrigibility” to the list of those entitling a party to counsel. Compare id., with
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981).
100. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012).
101. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3. Presumably, as
demonstrated in Wilkins, the putative father was entitled to make such a showing at any time prior to the
termination action. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985).
102. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). To demonstrate paternity under Georgia Code section 15-11-
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imposes additional requirements that the father file both a petition for
legitimation and notice of the petition with the juvenile court within
thirty days of receiving a summons.103 Given the legislature’s intent
to ensure parents’ right to counsel in termination proceedings,104 it is
counterintuitive that a revision increasing a father’s burden of proof
could be read to diminish his right to counsel.
The Georgia Supreme Court has not considered a father’s right to
counsel in legitimation proceedings under the current Juvenile Code.
Although Wilkins has not been overruled, the Georgia Court of
Appeals decisions considering the issue of representation in
legitimation proceedings have increasingly departed from its
holding.105
In Alexander v. Guthrie, the Court of Appeals considered whether
a putative father is entitled to court-appointed representation in the
context of legitimation proceedings brought in superior court.106 In
Alexander, an indigent putative father filed a pro se petition to
legitimate his child after receiving notification that the child’s mother
had consented to an adoption by the child’s stepfather.107 On appeal
52(b), the putative father needed only provide proof that he was the child’s biological father. O.C.G.A.
§ 15-11-52(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3. Because current law requires that a father
legitimate his child to obtain standing to contest a termination, O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012), in
addition to proving his biological paternity, the putative father must demonstrate that he has not
abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his child and that he is not an unfit
parent. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987).
103. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012).
104. Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307–08 (Ga. 1976) (“It is thus quite evident that
the entire legislative scheme written into the pertinent provisions of the Juvenile Code was intended to
provide to an indigent parent effective representation at all stages of any proceeding involving the
termination of that parent’s right to his or her child.”).
105. See In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding an indigent putative father was not
entitled to court-appointed counsel to represent him in juvenile court legitimation proceedings); In re
S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to consider a father’s contention that he was
entitled to representation to enable him to initiate a legitimation action in juvenile court because he
failed to raise the issue at the lower court level); Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding an indigent putative father had no right to court-appointed counsel in a legitimation
proceeding brought in superior court).
106. Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 805.
107. Absent a handful of statutory exceptions, prior to a child’s adoption, a putative father’s rights
must be terminated either in juvenile court (typically the culmination of a deprivation action brought by
the State) or in superior court (typically in private adoptions where deprivation is not an issue).
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-10 (2010). While a father who has not legitimated has no standing to contest a
termination regardless of whether a father’s rights are terminated in superior court or juvenile court, the
termination procedures are dealt with in separate portions of the code. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (2012)
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from the trial court’s denial of his legitimation petition, the putative
father contended that the trial court erred in failing to provide him
with court-appointed counsel.108 Despite its implicit admission that
Wilkins might be read to suggest otherwise,109 the court, without
explaining its reasoning, held that the putative father “was not
entitled to have an attorney appointed to represent him at public
expense in the legitimation proceedings.”110 Although the court
failed to articulate a justification for distinguishing Wilkins, because
the holding in Wilkins was based on the right to counsel afforded to
parties in a deprivation proceeding as established by the Georgia
Juvenile Code,111 Wilkins arguably would not apply to a legitimation
proceeding brought in superior court that was unconnected to a
deprivation action.112 In fact, just ten months later, in Ghrist v.
Fricks, when considering a putative father’s right to present evidence
to establish his paternity in a superior court legitimation hearing, the
Georgia Court of Appeals expressly distinguished Wilkins on the
ground that it involved a termination case brought in juvenile court
and was decided pursuant to the Juvenile Code.113

(governing termination of parental rights in juvenile court); id. § 15-11-98 (requiring putative father
legitimate in order to have standing to contest termination proceedings in juvenile court); O.C.G.A.
§ 19-8-11 (2010) (specifying procedure for termination of parental rights in superior court); id. § 19-812 (requiring putative father to legitimate in order to have standing to contest termination proceedings in
superior court).
108. Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 806.
109. Id. at 806–07.
110. Id. at 806.
111. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ga. 1985) (construing O.C.G.A. § 1511-30(b) (1981) and O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3).
112. Alexander, 454 S.E.2d 805; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (requiring
heightened procedural safeguards where the State interfered with a putative father’s relationship with his
child).
113. Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part by Brine v. Shipp,
729 S.E.2d 393, 396–397 (Ga. 2012). In holding that collateral estoppel prevented a putative father from
presenting evidence to establish his paternity and legitimate a child who already had another legal father
in a superior court proceeding, the court distinguished Wilkins as follows:
[Wilkins] was a termination case brought in juvenile court and the Supreme Court’s
decision was based upon OCGA § 15-11-52(b) . . . . As discussed . . . below, the instant
case was not, despite its denomination as such, a termination of parental rights case.
Moreover, the circumstances presented and interests sought to be protected are clearly
different in this case.
Id. at 506.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4

886

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

Since Alexander, the Court of Appeals has only considered an
indigent putative father’s right to court-appointed counsel in juvenile
court legitimation proceedings on two occasions, but on neither
occasion did the court find that the putative father was entitled to
counsel.114 Perhaps surprisingly, the issue was not raised on appeal
until 2007 in In re S.M.G.115 In that case, the Court of Appeals
declined to examine the merit of a father’s contention that a
termination of his parental rights must be reversed because the
juvenile court failed to provide him with counsel to legitimate his
children.116 Although shortly after the termination petition was filed,
the court appointed an attorney to represent the father in the
termination proceeding, the record revealed no evidence that the
father or his attorney made any attempt to file a legitimation petition
before the deadline or that either requested funds for that purpose.117
Although the S.M.G. court reasoned that it could not examine the
denial of counsel claim on appeal because it was not raised at the
lower level, this reasoning seemingly contradicts Wilkins, where the
court decided that the putative father was entitled to counsel despite
his failure to request it.118 Nonetheless, Wilkins is likely
distinguishable from S.M.G. because the statute requiring a father to
file a petition to legitimate differs from the statute examined in
Wilkins.119
In In re J.S., the only Georgia appellate case to directly consider
the issue of a putative father’s right to counsel in juvenile court
legitimation proceedings, the Court of Appeals cited Alexander for
the proposition that an indigent father seeking to establish paternity
114. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007).
115. In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 296.
116. Id. at 297.
117. Id.
118. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985).
119. Unlike the paternity statute in Wilkins, which simply entitled a putative father to present
evidence to establish his paternity in conjunction with a termination of his parental rights, Georgia Code
section 15-11-98 requires that a putative father initiate the legitimation action by filing a notice and a
petition. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98 (2012), with O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981). Under this
scheme, it is logical that a court would not appoint counsel to represent a father in legitimation
proceedings until he has taken some action to initiate those proceedings.
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and legitimate his child in conjunction with a juvenile court
termination action has no right to court-appointed counsel.120
However, the court failed to articulate why Alexander, rather than
Wilkins, should apply.121 As in J.S., Wilkins examined the right to
counsel in the context of a juvenile court paternity proceeding
governed by Article 15 of the Georgia Code, where the State sought
to terminate a father’s parental rights.122 Alexander, on the other
hand, was decided in the context of a private adoption by the child’s
stepfather, governed by Article 19 of the Georgia Code, where the
State was not involved.123 Given this distinction, along with the
amplified need for due process protections in cases where the State is
an actor,124 it seems that the court’s reliance on Alexander in the
context of juvenile court legitimation proceedings was misplaced.
Applying procedural standards intended to govern litigation between
private parties to cases where the State seeks to deprive individuals
of their parental rights, as the court did in J.S., appears to run afoul of
Fourteenth Amendment principles.
III. ESTABLISHING FATHERS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GEORGIA
JUVENILE COURT LEGITIMATION PROCEEDINGS
To ensure putative fathers receive constitutionally adequate
protection where the state seeks to sever relationships with their
children, Georgia law should be amended to prevent juvenile courts
from denying legitimation petitions brought by unrepresented,
indigent fathers.
A. The Nature Of The Right To Counsel
Although legitimation proceedings brought in response to privately
initiated adoption petitions and those brought to obtain standing to
120. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
121. Id.
122. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 24.
123. Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
124. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); In
re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987).
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challenge state-initiated terminations of parental rights are decided in
different courts,125 their potential impact on the putative father’s
relationship with his child is virtually identical. In both instances, a
denial of the petition eliminates a father’s right to assert any
relationship interest in his child or to challenge an adoption.126
Nonetheless, in juvenile court legitimation proceedings, this interest
requires greater constitutional protection because of the state’s direct
role in extinguishing the relationship.127
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.128
Because parents’ right to custody of their children is a liberty interest
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,129 the critical
125. Georgia Code section 19-7-22 provides:
A father of a child born out of wedlock may render his relationship with the child
legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of the residence of the child’s
mother or other party having legal custody . . . of the child . . . . [However, a] legitimation
petition may be filed, pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection (e) of Code Section 15-1128, in the juvenile court of the county in which a deprivation proceeding regarding the
child is pending.
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-22(a), (d) (2010); see also O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28 (e)(2) (2012) (“The juvenile court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any legitimation petition filed pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22 as to a
child with respect to whom a deprivation proceeding is pending in the juvenile court at the time the
legitimation petition is filed.”).
126. Georgia Code section 19-8-12(f)(3)—articulating consequences of a denied legitimation petition
filed in response to a privately initiated adoption petition in superior court—is identical to Georgia Code
section 15-11-96(i)(3)—articulating consequences of a denied legitimation petition filed in response to a
state-initiated motion to terminate parental rights in juvenile court. Compare O.C.G.A. § 19-8-12(f)(3)
(2010), with id. § 15-11-96(i)(3) (2012). Both Code sections provide that after receiving notice of the
motion or petition:
A biological father who is not the legal father loses all rights to the child and . . . may not
thereafter object to the [child’s] adoption . . . if . . . he . . . [f]iles a legitimation petition
and the action is subsequently concluded without a court order declaring a finding that he
is the legal father of the child.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012); O.C.G.A.§ 19-8-12(f) (2010).
127. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; discussion infra Part II.B.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has found that the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes both procedural and substantive due process requirements in cases involving parents’ right to
custody of their children. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (imposing a procedural
due process requirement that evidence supporting termination of parental rights be proved by clear and
convincing evidence); Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (articulating a substantive due process requirement that the
State prove terminating a father’s custody is necessary to achieving a compelling government purpose).
129. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). A parent’s right to raise
his or her child free from state interference “has been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest worthy of
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 38 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 845 (1977)).
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distinction between the degree of due process required in cases such
as Alexander, where a father seeks to challenge a privately initiated
adoption,130 and Wilkins, where a father seeks to challenge a
termination initiated by the Department,131 is state action.
Traditionally, the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted as a
limitation on government action as opposed to private conduct.132
Although much debate has ensued as to whether, and in what
circumstances, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to private actors
who challenge other individuals’ liberty or property interests through
state courts,133 it is well-settled that due process is required when a
government entity, such as DFCS, seeks to divest an individual of a
protected liberty interest.134 Hence, in legitimation and termination of
parental rights cases where the state is a party, parental rights
unquestionably require constitutional protection.135
Although the Supreme Court has occasionally found that court
enforcement of private claims constitutes state action requiring
Fourteenth Amendment protection, the principle has not been
consistently applied, possibly because of the potential for
characterizing all private conduct as state action.136 As to legitimation
claims, on at least one occasion, the Georgia Supreme Court found
that pursuing a privately initiated adoption through state courts
130. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 21(Ga. 1985).
131. Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
132. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 519–51 (4th ed.
2011).
133. Id. at 557–58. Under the “entanglement exception” to the state action doctrine, the Fourteenth
Amendment applies where the state “affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private
conduct.” Id. at 539. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court held that “the ‘action of state courts . . .
is . . . regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. at 540
(footnote omitted) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948)). Shelley has incited controversy
as to the limits of the state action doctrine, and while the Court has rarely applied Shelley in subsequent
cases, it has also failed to “articulate[] any clear limiting principles.” Id. at 540–41.
134. See, e.g., In re H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d 33, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). Emphasizing the gravity of a
juvenile court’s order granting DFCS’s motion to terminate a mother’s parental rights, the Georgia
Court of Appeals observed that “‘[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.’” Id.
at 33 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
135. See, e.g., In re B.N.A., 546 S.E.2d 819, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the State’s failure
to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence in a termination proceeding was a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring reversal); In re H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d at
33.
136. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 523, 540.
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pursuant to state law was significant enough to entitle the father to
enhanced procedural safeguards.137 However, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized a clear distinction, finding that
legitimation proceedings brought for the purpose of obtaining
standing to challenge privately initiated adoptions require less
stringent due process protections than those brought for the purpose
of obtaining standing to challenge state-initiated terminations of
parental rights.138
While the Court has stopped short of finding that due process
requires appointment of counsel to indigent parents in every
termination case, in this context, it has encouraged states to impose
more rigorous due process requirements than are minimally
permissible under the Constitution.139 Accordingly, the Georgia
legislature has imposed a statutory right to counsel in juvenile court
termination proceedings.140 Deferring to the legislative judgment on
the issue, reviewing courts have refused to condone some judicially
imposed limitations on the right, even when not expressly prohibited
by statute.141 Juvenile courts have accordingly been prevented from
utilizing statutory loopholes to undermine the purpose of the
requirement.142
Unfortunately, reviewing courts have failed to apply the same
logic to juvenile courts’ denial of counsel in legitimation
proceedings.143 This practice is plainly incompatible with the
137. In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987); discussion infra Part II.B.
138. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
139. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981).
140. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012).
141. See, e.g., Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ga. 1976); In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d
9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to apply harmless error standard to court’s failure to ensure mother’s
waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); In re A.M.A., 607 S.E.2d 916, 923 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004) (establishing that when a non-indigent parent appears without counsel at a termination
proceeding, the juvenile court has a duty to delay the proceedings long enough to ascertain whether she
has acted with reasonable diligence in retaining an attorney and whether her failure to procure counsel is
due to factors beyond her control).
142. See, e.g., Nix, 225 S.E.2d at 307–08. In requiring a juvenile court to provide a mother with a
pauperized transcript for the purposes of appeal despite the absence of an explicit statutory requirement,
the Georgia Supreme Court observed that it was the legislature’s intent to effectuate due process in
termination proceedings. Id.
143. See, e.g., In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2007). But see In re B.N.A., 546 S.E.2d 819, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing termination of
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legislature’s goal of protecting parents’ right to due process in
termination proceedings.144 While in private proceedings, distinctions
may allow courts to treat estranged putative fathers differently from
mothers who have established relationships with their children,145
such distinctions are far less justified when the mother’s conduct has
been so egregious that she has lost custody to the state.146 Moreover,
in legitimation proceedings, where the burden of proof is on the
putative father to establish biological paternity and parental fitness,
denying counsel may create an even greater disadvantage than in
termination proceedings, where the state has the burden of proof.147
B. Establishing A Father’s Right To Counsel In Juvenile Court
Legitimation Proceedings
To prohibit additional infringements on putative fathers’
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Georgia courts need a clear standard
requiring court-appointed counsel in juvenile court legitimation
proceedings. Given Georgia courts’ failure to develop and apply
consistent standards,148 the General Assembly should amend the
Juvenile Code to provide a statutory basis for the right. However, in
light of the substantial budgetary constraints plaguing Georgia

a putative father’s parental rights despite his failure to legitimate, where the Department failed to
prepare a case plan for reunification pursuant to court order).
144. See Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985).
145. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 267–68 (1983) (“If one parent has an established custodial
relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship,
the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal
rights.”); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1979) (finding unwed fathers who may remain
anonymous to the state until taking action to legitimate their children are not “similarly situated” to
unwed mothers for purposes of pursuing a wrongful death suit).
146. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267. Statutes that treat putative fathers and mothers differently with respect to
rights to veto an adoption “may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother
and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.” Id. But see In re
V.M.T., 534 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). In In re V.M.T., the Georgia Court of Appeals
consolidated appeals from juvenile court orders terminating the parental rights of both parents. Id. at
454. After rejecting the putative father’s contention that requiring him to legitimate his child in order to
obtain standing to contest a termination violates Fourteenth Amendment principles, the court affirmed
termination of his parental rights and proceeded to consider the merits of the mother’s appeal. Id.
147. In re A.B., 579 S.E.2d 779, 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). In proceedings to terminate parental rights,
the State has the burden to prove parental misconduct or inability by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
148. See In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250; discussion infra Part II.C.
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juvenile courts,149 to the extent feasible, the statute should be tailored
to remedy the specific issue of denying counsel in legitimation
proceedings that could actually result in a de facto termination of
parental rights.
1. Budgetary Constraints and Denial of Counsel
While inadequate funding of juvenile courts is hardly a new
problem, decreased tax revenue resulting from the current recession
has exacerbated the issue.150 Georgia juvenile courts are funded
solely by county governments and in proceedings not involving
delinquency, must pay for counsel for children and all indigent
parties from the budget allocated to them by the county
commissioner.151 This funding structure has the unfortunate
consequence of intensifying the disparity of resources between poor
and wealthy counties, so the counties that are most in need receive
the smallest allocation of financial resources.152 Even in
circumstances where an indigent party’s right to counsel is statutorily
established, inadequate funding has forced many juvenile courts to
cut corners that undermine the quality of the representation
provided.153
149. See generally Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evaluating Judicial
Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 115 (2011) (discussing the current recession’s
impact on allocation of resources to juvenile courts).
150. See, e.g., Preston Sparks, Juvenile Court Cases on Rise County Adds Funding for Judge’s
Position, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 1, 2006, at B2, available at 2006 WLNR 9452121. Unable to procure
funding from the county in time to prevent a backlog of juvenile court cases, a part-time Columbia
County juvenile court judge worked additional days without pay. Id.; see also Mike Buffington, Juvenile
Court Gets a Little More Funding, BARROW J. (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.barrowjournal.com/archives
/5764-Juvenile-Court-get-a-little-more-funding.html. When Barrow County’s Board of Commissioners
cut funding for indigent defense in half, the juvenile court was forced to request additional funding to
cover the cost of providing counsel for indigent parents. Id.
151. Sarah Gerwig-Moore & Leigh S. Schrope, Hush, Little Baby, Don’t Say a Word: How Seeking
the “Best Interests of the Child” Fostered a Lack of Accountability in Georgia’s Juvenile Courts, 58
MERCER L. REV. 531, 536 (2007) (“Counties bear financial responsibility for funding counsel in
juvenile deprivation matters . . . .”); Georgia’s County Governments, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-589.
152. See COMMON WISDOM, supra note 96, at 13.
153. MELINDA MOORE & ALLISON MCWILLIAMS, UNIV. OF GA., A STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT OF
GEORGIA PARENT REPRESENTATION IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS 4 (2010), available at
http://w2.georgiacourts.org/cj4c/files/Final%20PA%20Merged%20Report.pdf. A statewide examination
of available data on parent representation revealed that attorneys are frequently given little time to
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Unsurprisingly, facing these practical challenges and in the
absence of a statute creating a clear mandate, juvenile courts often
decline to provide counsel to indigent fathers in legitimation
proceedings.154 Moreover, denying legitimations produces an even
greater cost benefit because it renders fathers unable to contest
terminations of their parental rights.155 When a court denies a
legitimation, it avoids the cost of providing counsel to an indigent
fathers in subsequent termination proceedings, which are typically far
lengthier and more complex than legitimation proceedings,156 and
also decreases the length of termination proceedings—thereby
decreasing the number of hours in court for all attorneys and court
staff who must be present.157 With the odds already stacked against
the indigent father who must, with no legal training, present a pro se
case for legitimation, these circumstances incentivize juvenile courts
to deny the legitimation.
2. A Proposed Remedy
To remedy this issue, the proposed statute must prevent courts
from unfairly denying counsel in legitimation proceedings for the
purpose of denying fathers the right to challenge terminations.
However, because in reality only a small percentage of legitimation
petitions are actually denied, it may be unrealistic to burden courts
prepare cases and often meet with clients for the first time in the courtroom. Id. at 3. Additionally,
researchers found that low attorney pay and overall lack of funding for juvenile courts impacted the
quality of representation parents received. Id.; see also
Gerwig-Moore & Schrope, supra note 151, at 536 (explaining that in some circumstances, lack of
adequate funding for Georgia juvenile courts has resulted in courts’ failing to appoint counsel for
children in delinquency proceedings).
154. See, e.g., In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296, 296
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
155. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i)(2) (2012).
156. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No.
79-6423), 1980 WL 340038, at *15 (“Proceedings to terminate parental rights are extremely complex.
The statutory standards for the termination of parental rights . . . require the court to make its
determination on the basis of complicated factual issues that require close analysis of human behavior.”
(footnote omitted)).
157. Courts typically conduct a single hearing regarding termination of parental rights of both parents.
See, e.g., In re M.J.L., 643 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re T.W.O., 643 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007); In re C.P., 630 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
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with the additional cost of providing counsel for all indigent fathers
in legitimation proceedings. To prevent obligating courts with an
unwarranted burden, the statute should be narrowly tailored to
address the specific harm in question. To accomplish this, the
amended statute should prevent juvenile courts from denying
legitimation petitions where the father is unrepresented. Although
this approach would require juvenile courts to make a pretrial
prediction as to whether they might deny the petition and appoint
counsel even if denial is inevitable, it would require a lesser
expenditure than an absolute requirement that courts appoint counsel
in all legitimation cases.
This proposed solution is similar to the “actual imprisonment”
standard the United States Supreme Court has established in the
criminal context.158 Recognizing that extending a constitutional right
to counsel to all indigent criminal defendants would impose an undue
financial burden on states, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court held
that states are only required to provide counsel if the defendant is
sentenced to actual imprisonment.159 In response to subsequent
criticism that the standard required judges to make predictive
evaluations concerning whether imprisonment might be imposed, the
Court defended the actual imprisonment standard as a “reasonably
workable” solution in light of the “substantial[] costs” that a more
inclusive standard would generate.160
If courts are capable of making such pretrial determinations based
largely on the character of the charged offense in criminal
proceedings, juvenile courts should be competent to make similar
pretrial determinations concerning legitimation petitions, as they
have access to substantially more information than is available in the
criminal context.161 Unlike in criminal proceedings, juvenile courts
158. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1972).
159. Id. at 37 n.7 (noting that the actual imprisonment standard would not impose too great a burden
on the “Nation’s legal resources”).
160. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
161. Case plans for reunification, which must be submitted to the court within thirty days of a child’s
removal from the family home, provide substantial information about the family, including a statement
of the reasons why the child cannot return safely to the home of either parent. See generally O.C.G.A.
§ 15-11-58(b) (2012). At each subsequent permanency hearing, the Department must submit an
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have access to social and psychological histories, as well as the
child’s guardian ad litem’s recommendation regarding the petition.162
Additionally, by the time a legitimation petition is filed, in most
cases, juvenile courts will have received substantial information
about the father’s relationship with his child through other
hearings.163 Although this “actual denial” standard would prevent
courts from denying legitimation petitions if they fail to provide
counsel, courts could minimize this risk by appointing counsel
whenever there is any doubt as to the whether the petition should be
granted.164 Moreover, because the standard would not prevent a court
from granting a subsequent termination of the father’s rights, even if
a court was forced to grant a petition because of an inaccurate pretrial
assessment, the error would not produce a substantive difference in
the case’s ultimate outcome.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that parents have
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of
their children.165 Where the State seeks to terminate parental rights,
Georgia law requires that juvenile courts appoint counsel to indigent
parents to protect their right to due process.166 Although denying a
putative father’s petition to legitimate his child amounts to a de facto
termination of his parental rights, current precedent suggests juvenile
courts have no obligation to provide counsel for indigent fathers in
legitimation proceedings.167 Given the Georgia legislature’s
determination that due process requires court-appointed counsel

additional report identifying an updated permanency recommendation for the child and explaining the
reasoning behind this recommendation. Id. § 15-11-58(o)(2).
162. JOSLYN-GAUL, supra note 5, at 62.
163. See generally O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58 (2012) (identifying proceedings required to take place at
each stage of a deprivation case).
164. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(a)
(4th ed. 2004) (suggesting the same for criminal proceedings).
165. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
166. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012).
167. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
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when the State seeks to terminate the parent–child relationship,168
depriving indigent fathers of counsel in juvenile court legitimation
proceedings amounts to a constitutionally impermissible denial of
due process.
The Georgia Juvenile Code should be amended to create a clear
standard preventing juvenile courts from denying indigent fathers’
legitimation petitions without providing counsel for the legitimation
proceeding. To avoid creating an unnecessary financial burden on the
courts, the legislature should consider a scheme that allows juvenile
courts to grant, but not deny, legitimation petitions without
appointing counsel for the father.

168. Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307–08 (Ga. 1976).
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